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 Plaintiffs’ Opposition leaves no doubt that the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) 
merely rehashes rejected theories, rather than trying to satisfy the legal framework that led this 
Court to dismiss the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”).    First, Plaintiffs confirm that the SAC 
relies entirely on the account-provision and direct messaging theories that this Court concluded 
are barred by 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (“Section 230”).  Plaintiffs offer no reason for this Court to 
reconsider that sound judgment.  Second, Plaintiffs likewise confirm the SAC depends on a 
theory of causation that this Court previously deemed “too speculative” and “attenuated to raise a 
plausible inference of proximate causation.”  Instead of explaining how the SAC cures either of 
the fundamental defects that this Court identified, Plaintiffs almost completely ignore this 
Court’s opinion.  For these reasons, and as more fully explained in Twitter’s opening brief and 
below, the SAC should be dismissed with prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Section 230 Mandates Dismissal Of Plaintiffs’ Claims  
 Plaintiffs barely address this Court’s Section 230 analysis, directly citing this Court’s 
opinion only once, see Opp. 2, and devoting most of their opposition brief to repeating the 
account-provision and direct messaging theories of liability that this Court has already rejected.  
Plaintiffs’ sole new argument is that Section 230 does not bar a claim that explicitly relies on 
content to establish only the causation element of the claim.  That argument is irrelevant to this 
Court’s conclusions that both of Plaintiffs’ theories—account-provision and direct messaging—
seek to hold Twitter liable for its publishing decisions and are therefore barred by Section 230—
conclusions that provide a sufficient basis to dismiss the SAC with prejudice even without 
addressing Plaintiffs’ new causation argument.  And Plaintiffs’ new causation theory also fails in 
its own right—both because it conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent prohibiting plaintiffs from 
pleading around Section 230 and because Plaintiffs misread the two cases on which they 
principally rely.  Section 230 thus again requires dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims. 
A. Artful Pleading Cannot Circumvent Section 230 Immunity 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that the SAC continues to heavily feature and rely on “detailed 
descriptions of ISIS-related messages, images, and videos disseminated through Twitter” by 
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third-parties and “the harms allegedly caused by the dissemination of that content.”  Order 
Granting Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 47, at 8 (hereafter “Order”).  But they argue that such 
references “do not implicate [Section 230]” because Plaintiffs have banished all content-based 
allegations from the first two sections of the SAC, and so, supposedly, have “limited” “[a]ll 
references to content … to proving causation.”  Opp. 2.  This is wrong on multiple levels.  
Plaintiffs’ reliance on the content of user-generated messages to prove proximate causation is 
itself enough to trigger Section 230.  See infra 4-6.  And, even setting aside that defect, Plaintiffs 
are wrong that they can avoid Section 230 simply by moving their content-based allegations to a 
different section of the complaint.   
 As an initial matter, it is false that the first two sections of the SAC “do not refer to or 
depend on content at all.”  Opp. 2.  Repeating allegations verbatim from the FAC, the SAC’s 
first two sections, like the allegations that this Court addressed previously, “specifically fault[] 
Twitter for failing to detect and prevent the dissemination of ISIS-related content through the 
Twitter platform.”  Order 8-9.  Plaintiffs accuse Twitter of “failing to ‘actively monitor … and 
censor user content,” SAC ¶ 36, of “fail[ing] … to shut down clear incitements to violence by 
terrorists,” id. ¶ 30, of “refus[ing]” to “suspend … accounts … for promoting terrorism,” id. ¶ 
40, and of not deploying a “tracking system” to identify and “stop … terror content,” id. ¶ 37 
(emphasis added to each quote).  Thus, even as written, the SAC continues to “describe a theory 
of liability based on Twitter’s knowing failure to prevent ISIS from disseminating content 
through the Twitter platform, not its mere provision of accounts to ISIS.”  Order 7. 
 The Ninth Circuit, moreover, has repeatedly rejected attempts—like Plaintiffs’ efforts 
here—to “circumvent” Section 230 using “‘creative’ pleading.”  Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., __ F.3d 
__, 2016 WL 4729492, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 12, 2016); see also Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 
1096, 1102-1103 (9th Cir. 2009); Doe v. Backpage.com LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2016).  
“[W]hat matters” is not how plaintiffs organize their complaint or label their cause of action, but 
“whether the cause of action inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as the ‘publisher 
or speaker’ of content provided by another.”  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101-1102 (emphasis added); 
see also Order 5-6.  Contrary to what they assert, Plaintiffs cannot quarantine their content-based 
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allegations from the rest of the SAC by “strictly limit[ing]” those allegations to any one section.  
Opp. 4.  Allegations throughout the SAC illuminate the true nature of Plaintiffs’ claims, 
revealing why Plaintiffs assert accounts should have been blocked (because they would be used 
to disseminate terrorist-content), and how Plaintiffs expect Twitter to have identified those 
accounts (based on the content of their Tweets).  Indeed, Plaintiffs themselves rely on allegations 
about user-generated content in Section III of the SAC to advance an entire theory of liability 
that would otherwise be forfeited—the theory that Twitter allegedly “provided ISIS with Direct 
Message capabilities.”  Opp. 5 (citing only paragraphs in Section III); see also Motion to 
Dismiss SAC at 3 n.1 (asserting forfeiture).  Plaintiffs’ content-based allegations both in Section 
III and elsewhere confirm that they are still trying “to advance the same basic argument that 
[Section 230] plainly bars:  that [Twitter] published user-generated speech that was harmful to 
[the Plaintiffs].”  Kimzey, 2016 WL 4729492, at *2.   
B. Twitter’s Provision Of Accounts Is Publishing Activity 
Even setting aside Plaintiffs’ improper effort to disguise the essence of their claims 
through artful pleading, Plaintiffs do not dispute that the SAC—at best—continues to rely on an 
account-provision theory that this Court squarely rejected.  Order 9-12.  Plaintiffs again argue 
that “[p]roviding ISIS with a Twitter account is not publishing … because it does not involve 
reviewing, editing or deciding whether to publish or withdraw tweets.”  Opp. 3.  But this Court 
has already concluded otherwise, and Plaintiffs offer no good reason to reconsider that decision.     
As this Court explained, the decision about who may open a Twitter account is itself a 
“decision[] about what third-party content may be posted online.”  Order 9 (emphasis added).  
Presumptively allowing everyone with access to the Internet to sign up for an account is integral 
to Twitter’s decision that its platform should “allow[] for the freedom of expression for hundreds 
of millions of people around the world.”  SAC ¶ 35; see Order 11.  Imposing liability on Twitter 
based on who it permits to open an account—which would saddle it with the onerous task of 
screening every user—would change the content posted to Twitter’s platform and the nature of 
the platform itself.  Such a decision “regarding the ‘structure and operation’” of Twitter’s 
platform is thus “no less [a] publisher choice[],” than a decision about whether to withdraw or 
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alter content directly.  Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 20-21; see also Order 10-11.   
Plaintiffs mistakenly argue that “handing someone a tool [i.e., an account] is not the same 
thing as supervising their use of that tool.”  Opp. 3.  But as this Court recognized, the difference 
between the former and the latter is merely a matter of timing:  Twitter can restrict users from 
posting Tweets either by blocking them from signing up in the first place, by removing particular 
Tweets, or by shutting down accounts because of the Tweets they have posted.  See Order 10 
(“Under either theory, the alleged wrongdoing is the decision to permit third parties to post 
content—it is just that under plaintiffs’ provision of accounts theory, Twitter would be liable for 
granting permission to post … instead of for allowing postings that have already occurred.”).  At 
any stage, these decisions about what may be posted are publishing decisions, and therefore 
within the scope of Section 230 immunity. 
Plaintiffs also argue that decisions about accounts do not affect content because “many 
Twitter users who sign up for accounts never issue a single tweet.”  Opp. 3.  It is, of course, 
ludicrous to suggest that this case concerns accounts that were opened but never used.  And, in 
any event, a user who opens an account necessarily puts content online even without “issu[ing] a 
single tweet.”  Opp. 3.  As soon as a Twitter account  “spring[s] … up,” SAC ¶ 39, it displays a 
user name—such as “@TurMedia334,” id.—and a photograph—such as a “photograph of a 
bearded man’s face,” id.  That content conveys a simple, but significant, message:  follow me.  
Thus, even focusing only on what happens when an individual opens an account, any decision 
about whether to block that account necessarily “involves reviewing, editing, and deciding 
whether to publish or to withdraw from publication third-party content,” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 
1101, and so is a publishing decision protected by Section 230. 
C. Reliance On Content For Proximate Causation Triggers Sections 230  
Plaintiffs now concede that they rely on user-generated content and on Twitter’s alleged 
failure to block that content to try to satisfy the proximate cause element of their claim, but 
nevertheless argue that such reliance has “no bearing on the Court’s analysis under Section 230.”  
Opp. 4.  That is incorrect.  As the Ninth Circuit recently reiterated, the “basic argument that 
[Section 230] plainly bars” is that a provider of interactive computer services, like Twitter, 
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“published user-generated speech that was harmful to [the plaintiff],” Kimzey, 2016 WL 
4729492, at *2—an argument, in other words, that by publishing user-generated content, the 
provider caused some harm to befall the plaintiff.  Neither Internet Brands nor Barnes—the two 
cases on which Plaintiffs rely—hold otherwise.  
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Internet Brands actually undermines Plaintiffs’ theory.  In 
Internet Brands, the Ninth Circuit sustained a negligent failure to warn claim against a Section 
230 defense.  The Court explained that it was Internet Brand’s “failure to warn Doe of [the third 
parties’] rape scheme”—and not the publication of any harmful third-party content—that 
“caused her to fall victim to [that scheme].”  Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 850 (9th 
Cir. 2016) (emphasis added).  Doe’s claim sought to hold Internet Brands liable for harms arising 
from its “fail[ure] to generate its own warning,” and had “nothing to do with Internet Brands’ 
efforts, or lack thereof, to edit, monitor, or remove user generated content.”  Id. at 852 (emphasis 
added).  The Court repeatedly emphasized that the information giving rise to the duty to warn 
“was obtained by Internet Brands from an outside source, not from monitoring postings on the 
Model Mayhem Website,” and that the perpetrators of the harm Doe suffered “did not post on 
the website.”  Id. at 849.  The Court, in sum, took pains to stress that it was the platform’s own 
failure to speak and third-parties’ offline conduct—and not any decision to publish or not publish 
harmful user-generated content on the platform—that allegedly caused Doe’s injuries.  And the 
Court emphasized that imposing a duty to warn on Internet Brands would not “require [it] to 
remove any user content or otherwise affect how it publishes or monitors such content.”  Id. at 
851 (emphasis added).  The Court discussed “but for” causation solely to make the unexceptional 
point that Section 230 “does not provide a general immunity” to platforms simply because they 
are in the “business” of “publishing user content.”  Id. at 853.  Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs’ entire 
case—including their theory of causation—depends on harmful user-generated content and 
Twitter’s alleged publishing decisions with respect to that content.  And quite unlike the claims 
in Internet Brands, Plaintiffs’ claims here, if successful, “would significantly affect Twitter’s 
monitoring and publication of third-party content.”  Order 12.      
The promissory estoppel claim at issue in Barnes likewise “did not ‘seek to hold Yahoo 
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liable as a publisher or speaker of third-party content, but rather as the counterparty to a contract, 
as a promisor who has breached.’”  Order 11 (quoting Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1107).  In reaching 
this conclusion, the Court in Barnes emphasized that contract law treats a promise as a “legal 
duty distinct from the conduct at hand.”  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1107.  Because a promise is 
severable from the action promised, the Court concluded that “plaintiff’s theory of liability was 
based not on Yahoo’s ‘publishing conduct,’ but rather on its ‘manifest intention to be legally 
obligated to do something,’” Order 11 (quoting Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1107)—notwithstanding the 
fact that third-party content, in addition to Yahoo’s breach of a promise, may have been “a ‘but-
for’ cause of [plaintiff’s harm],” Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 853.  Having made such a promise, 
moreover, Yahoo “also signifie[d] the waiver of [any Section 230] defense[].”  Barnes, 570 F.3d 
at 1108.  “By contrast, [P]laintiffs here assert no theory based on contract liability and allege no 
promise made or breached by Twitter.”  Order 11.  Plaintiffs do not seek to hold Twitter liable 
for any legal duty apart from Twitter’s publishing conduct.  And unlike in Barnes, where 
Yahoo’s breach of its promise itself caused harm, Plaintiffs identify no cause for their harms 
other than third-party content posted on Twitter’s platform.  Plaintiffs’ claims therefore “derive 
liability from behavior that is identical to publishing or speaking.”  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1107.  
And, also unlike in Barnes, Twitter has done nothing to waive its Section 230 defenses.  Neither 
Internet Brands nor Barnes authorize claims, like those here, that purport to exclusively rely on 
the defendant’s publication of allegedly harmful third-party content to establish causation.    
D. Section 230 Applies With Equal Force To Third-Party Content Privately 
Transmitted Through Service-Provider Platforms 
Even though Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Direct Messages appear only in Section III 
of the SAC, Plaintiffs once again contend that Twitter is “liable … because it provided ISIS with 
Direct Message capabilities.”  Opp. 5 (citing SAC ¶¶ 43-45).  Completely ignoring this Court’s 
opinion, Plaintiffs repeat their prior argument that because direct messages are private 
communications, they “are not published,” Opp. 1, and so a theory of liability premised on their 
contents “does not seek to treat [Twitter] as a publisher or speaker,” Opp. 5.  This Court has 
already rejected that argument.  Order 14 (“[T]he private nature of Direct Messaging does not 
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remove the transmission of such messages from the scope of publishing activity under section 
230(c)(1).”); see also, e.g., Delfino v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 145 Cal. App. 4th 790, 795-796, 804-
808 (2006).  As this Court explained, and as Plaintiffs acknowledge, Congress enacted section 
230(c)(1) “in part to respond to a New York state court decision finding that an internet service 
provider could be held liable for defamation based on third-party content posted on its message 
boards.”  Order 14 (citing Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th 
Cir. 2008)).  For that reason, “the statute’s protections extend at least as far as the ‘the 
treat[ment] [of] internet service providers as publishers … for the purposes of defamation,’” 
and—like the law of defamation—thus reach even communications that are sent to only “‘one 
other’” person.  Order 14 (quoting Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1104).  Contrary to what Plaintiffs argue 
(at 7-9), this statutory history is relevant to, and necessary for, understanding the meaning of the 
term “publisher” in Section 230, see, e.g., Order 14 (discussing Congress’s intent in enacting 
Section 230); Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1104 (same); Zeran v. Am. Online, 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 
1997) (same), and the term has the same meaning in all cases to which it applies, see Barnes, 570 
F.3d at 1101 (“[T]he language of the statute does not limit its application to defamation cases.”).      
E. Allowing This Case To Proceed Would Cause Precisely The Harms Section 
230 Was Enacted To Prevent 
Finally, Plaintiffs’ contention (at 8-10) that their claims would further the policy goals of 
Section 230 actually turns the statute on its head.  Plaintiffs’ theories of liability would eviscerate 
the law’s protections and bring about precisely the problems Congress sought to avoid in 
establishing Section 230 immunity.  
Under Plaintiffs’ account-provision theory, liability would attach the moment a terrorist 
or defamer or fraudster uses an online platform to create an account, leaving service providers 
little choice but to exhaustively evaluate every would-be user before allowing him or her to sign 
up for service.  Even ignoring the question whether any major Internet service provider would 
continue to operate under such conditions, this extraordinary “burden would become the public’s 
burden.”  Smith v. People of the State of California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959) (invalidating strict 
liability anti-obscenity ordinance).  The resulting “self-censorship, compelled by the State, would 
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be a censorship affecting the whole public,” and through it, all online expression, “both 
[unprotected] and [protected], would be impeded.”  Id. at 154.   
That Plaintiffs’ theory would impose liability only if a service provider knowingly 
allowed a terrorist to sign-up for the service is no answer.  For one thing, the question whether a 
service provider knew of the danger posed by a particular would-be user at the moment that user 
signed-up for an account is a question of fact, so service providers would often be subjected to 
the burdensome process of discovery, even if not to ultimate liability.  For another, imposing 
liability based on a service provider’s knowledge—whether with respect to a particular user or 
particular user content—would undermine Congress’s second purpose of eliminating 
disincentives for service providers to self-police their platforms.  See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 
F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003).  Notice-based liability would “motivate providers to insulate 
themselves from receiving complaints” and  “discourage active monitoring of Internet postings.”  
Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 525 (Cal. 2006); accord Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.  Indeed, 
allegations in the SAC confirm that Section 230 is working exactly as Congress intended:  in just 
the last six months, Twitter’s responsible self-policing has led it to “suspend[] 235,000 accounts 
… for promoting terrorism,” SAC ¶ 40—an effort that Twitter may not have been able to 
undertake if doing so threatened to expose Twitter to liability. 
Plaintiffs’ alternative theory—that service providers should be liable for harms arising 
from any third-party content transmitted privately through their platforms—fares no better.  
Because policing private content raises a host of legal and practical concerns, service providers 
might well choose to protect themselves from liability on this front by altogether ceasing to offer 
private messaging applications.  Plaintiffs’ theory thus could do more than just chill lawful 
private online speech—it could eliminate it altogether.  
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion (at 8-9), courts have repeatedly recognized that 
application of the material support statutes very much can “implicate [the] free speech concerns”  
that animate Section 230.  For example, although the Supreme Court in Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (“HLP”) upheld 18 U.S.C. § 2339B under the First Amendment 
“as applied to the particular activities” that the plaintiffs wished to pursue, id. at 8, it did so only 
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after applying strict scrutiny in light of the important speech interests at stake, id. at 27-28 
(rejecting government’s request for intermediate scrutiny because “§ 2339B regulates speech on 
the basis of its content”).  And the Ninth Circuit, noting these interests and the manner in which 
the Supreme Court “carefully circumscribed its analysis in HLP,” has “hesit[ated] to apply that 
decision to facts far beyond those at issue in that case.”  Al Haramain Islamic Found. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Treasury, 686 F.3d 965, 1001 (9th Cir. 2011).  Indeed, Congress issued a similar 
warning in Section 2339B itself, advising that the material support statutes should be carefully 
construed to safeguard “the exercise of rights guaranteed under the First Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States.”  18 U.S.C. § 2339B(i).  Plaintiffs’ theory would improperly 
require this Court to disregard these many admonitions. 
Nor is there any conflict here between the Terrorism Civil Remedy provision and Section 
230.  Even assuming that Twitter’s opening of its platform for free speech to nearly all comers 
could somehow give rise to a cause of action under that provision—and it cannot—Congress 
enacted Section 230 for the very purpose of barring a cause of action where one might otherwise 
lie.  Whether that cause of action is predicated on the common law, supra at p. 7 (Congress 
enacted Section 230 in response to defamation case), a local ordinance, 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) 
(prohibiting any cause of action under “any State or local law that is inconsistent with this 
section”), or a federal statute such as the material support provisions, Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 
1157 (dismissing in part complaint alleging violations of federal Fair Housing Act on Section 
230 grounds); Backpage.com, 817 F.3d 12 (affirming dismissal of complaint alleging violations 
of TVPRA on Section 230 grounds), Section 230 mandates dismissal where a lawsuit seeks to 
hold a service provider liable for harm allegedly arising from third-party content. 
II. The SAC Fails To State A Claim Under The Terrorism Civil Remedy Provision 
A. The SAC Fails To Allege Facts Plausibly Establishing Proximate Cause  
Plaintiffs once again contend that to satisfy the proximate cause element of the Terrorism 
Civil Remedy they need only allege that “Twitter provided material support to ISIS and that ISIS 
carried out the attack in which one of its operatives killed Mr. Fields and Mr. Creach,” without 
showing that any of the acts allegedly constituting material support played even the slightest role 
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in the attack itself and regardless of how many intervening steps and actors separated those 
alleged acts from the attacker and the attack.  Opp. 13.  This Court has already concluded that 
such a breathtakingly broad theory of causation is “too speculative [and] attenuated to raise a 
plausible inference of proximate causation,” “[e]ven under plaintiffs’ proposed ‘substantial 
factor’ test.”  Order 12 & 13 n.4.  Plaintiffs completely ignore that conclusion:  They never once 
mention this Court’s proximate cause analysis, choosing instead to copy and paste two-and-a-
half pages from their previous opposition brief.  Compare Opp. 11-13, with Dkt. 31, at 13-15.  
This Court correctly rejected Plaintiffs’ overbroad theory of causation in dismissing the FAC, 
and should dismiss the SAC for the same reasons as well.     
The SAC, like the FAC, “do[es] not allege that ISIS recruited or communicated with Abu 
Zaid over Twitter, that ISIS or Abu Zaid used Twitter to plan, carry out, or raise funds for the 
attack, or that Abu Zaid ever viewed ISIS-related content on Twitter or even had a Twitter 
account.”  Order 2.  Indeed, the FAC at least tried to link Twitter to Abu Zaid by alleging that his 
“brother told reporters that [the attacker] had been very moved by ISIS’s horrific execution of al-
Kassasbeh, which ISIS publicized through Twitter.”  Order 12.  “That connection [was] tenuous 
at best,” id.—and the SAC, which omits the allegation that Abu Zaid was inspired by the 
execution of al-Kassasbeh, alleges even less.   
Instead, the SAC, like the FAC, piles speculation upon speculation:  (1) Twitter allegedly 
“knowingly and recklessly” permitted ISIS to create accounts on its platform (SAC ¶ 1), and then 
allegedly failed to take “meaningful action to stop” ISIS by “censor[ing] user content,” 
“shut[ting] down … ISIS-linked account[s],” or blocking the accounts from “springing right 
back up” (id. ¶¶ 19, 36, 39); (2) these failures allegedly permitted ISIS to send, via Twitter’s 
platform, messages designed to recruit new members, raise money, and spread propaganda (id. 
¶¶ 42-71); (3) recipients of those messages allegedly responded by joining ISIS and contributing 
funds (id. ¶¶ 47, 50, 51); (4) these recruits, funds, and publicity allegedly helped ISIS grow into a 
larger terrorist organization (id. ¶ 52); and (5) the attack that killed Mr. Fields and Mr. Creach 
was carried out by a man (Abu Zaid) who allegedly had been part of a “clandestine ISIS terror 
cell” when he was a student some unspecified amount of time in the past (id. ¶ 81).   
Case 3:16-cv-00213-WHO   Document 53   Filed 10/18/16   Page 15 of 22
  
Case No. 3:16-cv-00213-WHO 11 
 
Defendant Twitter’s Reply In Support of 
Twitter’s Motion to Dismiss the SAC 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Courts repeatedly have rejected similarly circuitous attempts to link businesses to acts of 
terrorism under the Terrorism Civil Remedy.  The Second Circuit, for example, dismissed any 
suggestion that “providing routine banking services to organizations and individuals said to be 
affiliated with al Qaeda—as alleged by plaintiffs—proximately caused the September 11, 2001 
attacks or plaintiffs’ injuries.”  In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 118, 124 (2d 
Cir. 2013).  And the Second Circuit reached the same conclusion about allegations that UBS had 
provided cash to a state sponsor of terrorism that would be used to cause and facilitate terrorist 
acts, Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 97 (2d Cir. 2013), and about allegations that defendants 
had “provided funding to purported charity organizations known to support terrorism that, in 
turn, provided funding to al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations,” Terrorist Attacks, 714 F.3d 
at 123-125.  The district court cases that Plaintiffs cite have “reject[ed] the contention that any 
reckless contribution to a terrorist group or its affiliates, no matter how attenuated, will result in 
civil liability, without the demonstration of a proximate causal relationship to the plaintiff’s 
injury.”  Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (second emphasis 
added), cited by Opp. 11-12.  And the facts in those cases established a far closer causal nexus 
than is present here.   In Linde, for example, evidence revealed that the defendant bank had wired 
“‘martyr’ payments to the immediate relatives of the Hamas suicide attackers who perpetrated 
four of the terrorist attacks at issue,” and plaintiffs were able “to trace” other “transfers for 
Hamas leaders to specific attacks.”  Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 287, 329 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015), appeal pending, 2d Cir. No. 16-2134.  Plaintiffs have alleged nothing remotely 
approaching that degree of connection between Abu Zaid and the “material support” that Twitter 
allegedly provided.  For this reason as well, the SAC must be dismissed.1 
B. The Justice Against Sponsors Of Terrorism Act Confirms That The Second 
Amended Complaint Fails To State A Claim Under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) 
As Twitter has explained, the SAC also must be dismissed because it fails to allege facts 
                                                 
1 Further, Plaintiffs do not even attempt to argue that the SAC states a claim under the “direct 
relationship” test that the statute’s “by reason of” language requires this Court to apply.  See Dkt. 
No. 49, at 12 n.4; Dkt. No. 27, at 21; Dkt. No. 32, at 11; see also Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New 
York, N.Y., 559 U.S. 1, 10 (2010); Couch v. Cate, 379 F. App’x 560, 565 (9th Cir. 2010).  
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plausibly establishing that Twitter’s conduct involved “violent” or “dangerous” acts that 
“appear[ed] to be intended” to achieve certain specifically defined terrorist purposes, namely “to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population,” “to influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion,” or “to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping,” id. § 2331(1)(A), (B).  See Dkt. No. 49, at 6 n.2; Dkt. No. 27, at 
23-25; Dkt. No. 32, at 13-15.  Such facts must be pled to establish that Twitter committed an act 
of “international terrorism” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1), as required by the 
provision under which Plaintiffs have brought their claims, 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).  See SAC at 15.  
A recent amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2333, enacted as part of the Justice Against Sponsors of 
Terrorism Act (“JASTA”), Pub. L. No. 114-222 (enacted Sept. 28, 2016), further confirms that 
Twitter’s ordinary business conduct does not qualify as an act “international terrorism” and that 
Plaintiffs therefore have not and cannot state a claim against Twitter under § 2333(a).2 
JASTA, among other things, amends 18 U.S.C. § 2333 to create a new subsection (d) 
providing limited causes of action for aiding and abetting and conspiracy liability.  Before 
JASTA, courts had held that the Terrorism Civil Remedy Provision did not permit any aiding-
and-abetting or secondary liability claims.  See Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 
F.3d 685, 689-690 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc); Terrorist Attacks, 714 F.3d at 123; Rothstein, 708 
F.3d at 97-98.  Some out-of-circuit courts, however, had formulated a convoluted “chain of 
incorporations by reference” to permit some secondary-like claims to proceed under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2333(a) under certain circumstances.  E.g., Boim, 549 F.3d at 690.  Whatever the merits of that 
(rather strained) formulation, it imposed a substantial hurdle on plaintiffs—a requirement to 
                                                 
2 JASTA was enacted after Twitter moved to dismiss the SAC and about a week before Plaintiffs 
filed their opposition.  By its terms, JASTA applies to any civil action pending on the date of 
enactment.  See JASTA, § 7(1), Pub. L. No. 114-222.  Twitter assumes, solely for the purposes 
of this motion, that JASTA applies retroactively to this action but reserves the argument that 
such retroactive application would violate Twitter’s rights under the First Amendment and the 
Due Process Clause.  See Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730 
(1984) (“The retroactive aspects of legislation, as well as the prospective aspects, must meet the 
test of due process, and the justifications for the latter may not suffice for the former.”).     
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allege and prove that not only the terrorist himself, but also the alleged secondary actor, had 
committed an “act of international terrorism” by engaging in conduct that “involve[d] violent 
acts or acts dangerous to human life” and that “appear[ed] to be intended” to achieve certain 
specified terrorist purposes.  18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A), (B); see, e.g., Stansell v. BGP, Inc., 2011 
WL 1296881, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Mar., 31, 2011) (dismissing claim for failure to plead facts 
sufficient to satisfy the “appear to be intended” requirement).   
With JASTA, Congress has now rationalized and clarified secondary liability under the 
statute by providing a coherent and “widely recognized … legal framework for how such 
liability should function,” JASTA, § 1(5), Pub. L. No. 114-222.  At least with respect to 
defendants—like Twitter here—whose own conduct plainly did not involve a “violent” or 
“dangerous” act that “appear[ed] to be intended” to achieve any of the specified terrorist 
purposes, Dkt. No. 49, at 6 n.2; Dkt. No. 27, at 23-25; Dkt. No. 32, at 13-15, the only provision 
of § 2333 under which any claim may even theoretically be asserted is subsection (d) (for aiding 
and abetting or conspiracy) and not subsection (a) (for direct liability).  No other interpretation of 
the statute makes sense.  If a full panoply of secondary claims could be brought under subsection 
(a), then newly enacted subsection (d) would be entirely redundant.  That would violate the 
strong presumption against superfluity.  See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 89 (2004).  And it 
would disregard the statement in JASTA’s preamble that adding subsection (d) was “necessary 
to recognize the substantive causes of action for aiding and abetting and conspiracy liability.”  
JASTA, § 1(4), Pub. L. No. 114-222 (emphasis added).  Moreover, channeling secondary claims 
into subsection (d) would respect the considered policy judgments Congress made in carefully 
defining the scope of secondary liability under the statute.  Plaintiffs’ claims may be brought, if 
at all, under subsection (d) alone.       
Because Plaintiffs have not asserted a claim under § 2333(d), and because they have not 
pled facts plausibly establishing a claim under § 2333(a), the SAC must be dismissed. 
III. The Dismissal Of Plaintiffs’ Claims Should Be With Prejudice 
 Plaintiffs do not dispute that if the Court again finds their claims lacking, then this action 
should be dismissed with prejudice and with no further leave to amend.  Twitter has already 
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briefed three separate motions to dismiss in this case; especially given Section 230’s objective of 
shielding Internet platforms from the burdens of litigation, Twitter should not be put to the 
burden of having to move to dismiss yet again.  And any amendment Plaintiffs might attempt, 
whether in light of JASTA or otherwise, would be futile, and so contrary to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. 
 First, if Plaintiffs were to try to reframe their claims as aiding and abetting claims, then 
Section 230 would bar those claims for the same reasons that their present claims are barred.  As 
with any other theory of liability, Section 230 applies with full strength against claims based on 
an aiding and abetting theory.  See, e.g., Goddard v. Google, Inc., 2008 WL 5245490 at *7 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 17, 2008) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that aiding and abetting liability is beyond the 
scope of § 230 and holding that plaintiff’s attempt to hold website liable under aiding and 
abetting theory was “simply inconsistent with § 230”); PatentWizard, Inc. v. Kinko’s, Inc., 163 
F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1071 (D. S.D. 2001) (holding aiding and abetting claim barred by Section 
230); Doe ex rel. Roe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 104 F. Supp. 3d 149, 161 n.9 (D. Mass. 2015) 
(same), aff’d sub nom. Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016).  
Indeed, given that Section 230 is framed as a shield from liability for content generated by 
someone else, secondary liability is at the heart of the statute.    
To state a claim for aiding and abetting liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d), a plaintiff 
must plead and prove that the defendant “knowingly provid[ed] substantial assistance … [to] the 
person who committed” the “act of international terrorism” that injured the plaintiff.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2333(d); see also JASTA, § 1(5), Pub. L. No. 114-222 (dictating that Halberstam v. Welch, 
705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983), “provides the proper legal framework for how [aiding and 
abetting] liability should function”); Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488 (“the defendant must 
knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation”).  For the reasons already discussed, 
however, Section 230 would bar any claim that Twitter provided “substantial assistance” by 
providing accounts or allowing direct messaging.  See supra pp. 3-4, 6-7. 
 Second, any aiding and abetting claim would also fail because the facts alleged in the 
SAC are not sufficient to support a claim for relief under the Halberstam framework that 
Congress required courts to apply.  See JASTA, § 1(5), Pub. L. No. 114-222.  The SAC alleges 
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nothing that plausibly establishes Twitter “knowingly … assist[ed] the principal violation”—
here, Abu Zaid’s attack.  Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488 (emphasis added); see also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2333(d) (defendant must have “knowingly provid[ed] substantial assistance … [to] the person 
who committed” the “act of international terrorism” that injured the plaintiff (emphasis added)).  
Not a single allegation suggests that Twitter knew Abu Zaid even existed, let alone that Twitter 
knew Abu Zaid would attack the training center in Jordan.   
Moreover, the SAC also fails to allege facts plausibly establishing that Twitter’s alleged 
conduct “substantially assist[ed] the principal violation.”  Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488 
(emphasis added).  Halberstam identified six factors a court should consider to determine 
whether assistance was “substantial.”  These factors are: “the nature of the act encouraged; the 
amount and kind of assistance given; the defendant’s absence or presence at the time of the tort; 
his relation to the tortious actor; and the defendant’s state of mind,” 705 F.2d at 483-484, as well 
as the “duration of the assistance provided,” id. at 484.  The only way in which Twitter allegedly 
“assisted” Abu Zaid was by letting some other persons affiliated with or supportive of ISIS sign-
up for Twitter accounts.  (Of course, if Plaintiffs were to continue to rely on how those persons 
used the accounts, that would only re-affirm Twitter’s Section 230 immunity.)  Plaintiffs have 
not alleged that these users communicated with Abu Zaid, or that Abu Zaid used Twitter to plan, 
fund, or carry out the attack, or even that he had a Twitter account.  The Halberstam factors thus 
also militate overwhelmingly against liability:  Plaintiffs do not (and apparently cannot) allege 
that Twitter provided any aid to Abu Zaid directly for any length of time, had any relationship 
with Abu Zaid himself, was present during the attack, or had any knowledge or intent that Abu 
Zaid would carry out the attack.  Any further leave to amend would therefore also be futile 
because it is evident that Plaintiffs have not and cannot plausibly allege that Twitter acted 
“knowingly” or that the assistance it allegedly provided was “substantial.”   
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed with 
prejudice in its entirety. 
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